

## **Middle East after ISIS Collapse**

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### **Abstract**

*The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIS, gained considerable power over a short period of time and at the height of its power, Al-Baghdadi controlled more broadly than Britain. And it was thought that for many years it could survive. But by the Iraqi and Syrian armies and the popular forces of these two countries and with the help of the IRGC, this terrorist group lost all of its occupied territories in Iraq and Syria. So, its collapse is important and will have significant effects on the geopolitics of the Middle East. The main subject of this article is the same. The main question of the paper is how would the ISIS collapse affect Middle Eastern politics? The answer to this question will be presented in six sections, all of which relate to the probabilities following the fall of ISIS in the Middle East. The research method of article is based on explanation method.*

### **Keywords**

*Middle East, Islamic World, ISIS, Takfiri Thought*

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## **Introduction**

After U.S attacked Iraq in 2003, Middle East and specially Persian Gulf, involved in a long period of instability. These instabilities at first showed themselves in terrorist attacks but after 2014, they entered a militant phase involving heavy weapons and massive destruction of cities and villages. On July 10, 2014, the ISIS terrorist group occupied the city of Mosul and occupied the city of Tikrit at the following day. In the following, they added vast areas under their control. Thus, the era of the Islamic caliphate began in Iraq and Levant. This period continued until 2017 and during this time, a level of irresponsible violence in the region was presented, in which the murder and killing of innocent people is only part of it (Micallef, 2017).

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIS, gained considerable power over a short period of time and at the height of its power, Al-Baghdadi controlled more broadly than Britain And it was thought that for many years it could survive. But by the Iraqi and Syrian armies and the popular forces of these two countries and with the help of the IRGC, this terrorist group lost all of its occupied territories in Iraq and Syria. So, its collapse is important and will have significant effects on the geopolitics of the Middle East.

The main subject of this article is the same. The main question of the paper is how would the ISIS collapse affect Middle Eastern politics? The answer to this question will be presented in six sections, all of which relate to the probabilities following the fall of ISIS in the Middle East. The research method of article is explanation method.

It should be mentioned that the war with ISIS has never been a major concern of US allies in the Middle East. From the outset, these countries looked at the post-war power struggle after ISIS war. What was important for Turkey was the fight against the Kurds; for the Kurds, it was achieve autonomy, for Saudi Arabia priority was regional contests, and for some Iraqi forces there were sectarian and ethnic conflicts. It was important for Russia to maintain presence in the Middle East and for Iran it was prevent terrorist from reaching its borders. The anti-IS coalition has always been a mask for continuing regional conflicts. Now this mask is no longer present and facts show more. In the following, we will consider the most important possibilities.

### **1. Continuing the Life of Extreme Thoughts**

After ISIS's defeat in the Territorial War, there are three possibilities for extremism: First, the damage to ISIS is so severe that al-Qaeda becomes the leader of extremism. Second, the two groups set aside divisions and establish closer ties. But these two possibilities are weak. Because:

The first prediction is based on the assumption that al-Qaeda is a strong and flexible group with a prudent strategy that uses regional riots in its favor. But this is not true. Although al-Qaeda still dominates widespread networks from North Africa to India. But recently he lost his strongest and most successful affiliate in Syria (JAN). In addition, the terrorist capabilities of al-Qaeda are declining. The compromise theory of these two groups is also unlikely. The followers of these two groups have a lot of disagreements. These differences are irreconcilable and rooted in religious and

strategic differences.

The third possibility is that ISIS will remain a strong terrorist group even after the defeat and loss of land; al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups will not disappear either (Frantzman, 2017).

## **2. The Crisis of the Kurds**

The entry of the Iraqi army into the strategic city of Kirkuk and the expulsion of Peshmerga forces from the city and the advance to the border lines of 2003 with the Kurdistan region is an example of the conflicts that the Middle East is preparing to enter after ISIS. After the first wave of ISIS invasion in Iraq and Syria, the Kurds were withdrawn as winners of this wave. In Iraq, the control of Kirkuk and the vast areas of the north of the country, which was abroad Kurdistan region and central government agreement about Kurdistan region borders, was provided to the Peshmerga forces. In Syria, despite the failure of ISIS's incursion into Kobani, the Americans began their extensive support from the Kurdish militias called the Syrian Democratic Forces, despite Ankara's harsh opposition. These support went so far as now that these forces took control of al-Raqa in eastern Syria

Of course, in Iraq, one should not imagine Barzani and the Democratic Party representing the Kurds, although the change party and the Patriotic Union of Iraqi Kurdistan were considered to be serious opponents of Barzani's policies. At the end of last year, forces affiliated with the Patriotic Union of Iraqi Kurdistan did not enter into clashes with government forces, they say (Abrams,

2017). This repetition is the same as Kurdish's never-ending scenario: Kurds have never been united.

### **3. The Resistance Front and Israel**

One of the most serious war options in the Middle East is the Israeli war and Hezbollah. A battle that, from the point of view of the parties, is a definite event, but the time has not yet come.

Israel believes that during the Syrian civil war, Hezbollah has gained a very large experience. From their point of view, Hezbollah, although isn't an army, is no longer a partisan group fighting in a guerrilla style. On the other hand, assessments show that Hezbollah has been able to increase its missile capacity and improve its quality after the 2006 war, particularly in recent years.

From Lebanon's point of view, Israel has been able to apply new tactics in its maneuvers in recent years, in addition to promoting attacking power. During this period, Israel has been working hard to repair its past weaknesses (Peters, 2017). Hezbollah knows that the Israeli army will destroy the foundations of civilian infrastructure and infrastructure, if war broke out, and cause heavy damage. All of this has led the parties to think carefully about the war (Karmon, 2017).

### **4. Iran and Saudi Arabia Crisis**

With the tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran rising, especially after the launch of Borkan missile at King Khalid airport, which Riyadh claimed that The Houthi group has been provided by Iran, Verbal conflicts between leaders of the two countries intensified.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and foreign minister Adel al-Jabir threatened Iran with a tough response to Iran. On this side of the Persian Gulf, President Rouhani also responded to the threats posed by the Saudi authorities (Cambanis, 2017).

But for some reason, such a war will not happen at this time; first, Saudi Arabia is not militarily capable of confronting Iran. What, the Yemeni war represents the military might of Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman, is trying to transform Saudi Arabia by realizing the vision that he has posed as 2030. The realization of such an outlook requires hundreds of billions of dollars in funding that the Saudi economy is currently not in a position to meet, the economy that experienced last year's deficit of \$ 98 billion according to Bloomberg, and according to the Interbank it has grown to close to zero percent (Srikant, 2017). So, it is likely that the Saudis will continue to pursue their traditional policy of using a Proxy war against Tehran.

## **5. War of Power in Iraq**

Undoubtedly, the emergence of ISIS in Iraq after Saddam was the biggest challenge for the nation-building in the country, and thus, with the fall of ISIS, it is expected to re-amplify this process and Iraq will become a relatively stable and powerful state from a state of bankruptcy. But by removing the common enemy named ISIS, the rivalries within the political and ethnic groups in Iraq will resume and again the central government and the Kurds on the one hand, the Shiites and Sunnis on the other hand, and the religious and secular groups on the other side will resume competitions .

This is while Iraq's political culture is not so good with compromise, bargaining, and consensus (Raudsik, 2017).

Even before the Iraqi soil was fully restored, the Kurds started their share in Iraq after ISIS. Meanwhile, the recapture of Mosul was largely owed to the Hazed al-Shabby, Shiite support, and, of course, to the Kurdish Peshmerga. The simple meaning of this is that in Iraq after ISIS, Sunnis will remain the most passive political group. The group that had main power in Iraq in Saddam's era and its initial support from ISIS also hoped that the Sunnis could regain power. It seems that the Iraqi government still has no clear plans to engage the Sunnis in the process of Iraq's political reconstruction and the process of nation-building, and this could put serious threats to political stability in this country even after ISIS fall. We should added to all of these Saudi, Qatari, and United Arab Emirates efforts to influence the internal environment of Iraq through the creation of a dispute (Macdonald AND Carey, 2018).

## **6. American Politics in the Middle East after ISIS**

The United States, as the most powerful country in the Middle East conflict, has an unparalleled importance in the changes in the region. Therefore, to understand the future of the Middle East, we have no choice but to become acquainted with US policies in the region.

ISIS's defeat not only does not end America's involvement in the Middle East, but also adds more. There will be no longer a war like the Iraq war with the widespread presence of the US military, but the commitment we are witnessing today will continue for a long time: perhaps 5,000 troops in Iraq, 1,000 in Syria, 1,000

to 2,000 in Jordan and other regional bases (Barnes and Barron, 2018).

The Trump government must fight the proxy wars, restore its relations with Turkey, establish peace between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, end the Yemeni war, have a clear position on Islam, and reduce tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia (and of course, between itself and Iran)

But it has serious problems. One of them is the Kurdish issue. The United States relies on YPG units in its fight against ISIS in Syria, which has close ties with the PKK. The PKK is in war with Turkey. YPG dominates the Syrian democratic forces and is a key element in the fight against ISIS. America's support for YPG has a greater significance than the fight against terrorism. The presence of US troops prevents major Turkish military attacks. If the US pulls back from Syria, YPG is compromised. This will increase the need for American involvement in Middle East crises (Bostedt, 2018).

Of course, Trump's personal reluctance to interfere in the Middle East crisis, as well as his internal crises in the face of disillusioned Democrats and Republicans, are two major obstacles to US involvement in the Middle East. While some in the opposite view believe that these two factors could be the reason for America's entry into a regional war in the Middle East, and it is clear that Iran is one of the parties to this conflict.

Washington's attitude toward the Qatari crisis showed that Riyadh was wrong in its assessment of the Trump Middle East approach, and Washington has supported the Qatari sanctions at



least until now. The Turks soon arrived from Riyadh with the fact that Trump was not what they thought. When Erdogan returned to Washington almost empty-handed, he knew he should be closer to Moscow and Tehran than before, but Riyadh came into tension with Qatar, with Tramp's support and the effects of 110 billion military deal hope. But the Tramp government don't stand aside Riyadh clearly in this crisis.

### **Conclusion**

Deirazor's recapture is one of the signs of the emergence of post ISIS era in the Middle East, but the fact is that the Middle East after ISIS would be more insecure than the Middle East during the ISIS era, at least in the short run, for the simple reason that ISIS after leaving Syria and Iraq Will be scattered in entire The region.

The ISIS phenomenon has led to the weakening of the Arabic core against the non-Arab context in the Middle East. Today, the differences in Arabic are even more than the peak of the Arab Spring in the years after 2011. In the Middle East after ISIS, the Arab core will continue to be in crisis in Libya, Yemen, Iraq and Syria, while Riyadh continues its tensions against Iran and Qatar. In the Arabian Orient, Egypt also suffered from the crisis of legitimacy, and Tel Aviv is pleased that the issue of Palestine has now been marginalized because of the internal Arab quarrels and their differences with Iran.

Saudi Arabia hopes that with Washington's support, it can become the hegemony of the Arab world and the most important player in the Middle East after ISIS era. But Iran's confrontation with ISIS undoubtedly could be in favor of Tehran and its regional

power in after-ISIS-Middle-East, especially through influence on the Shams. If the Trump government does not have a strong intention to enter the Middle East, it is unlikely that Riyadh would be able to halt Iran in after-ISIS-Middle-East and prevent its ability to be strengthened.

The Arabian Middle East after ISIS fall, in some ways, may be similar to the Middle East of the 1970s; a decade in which pan-Arabism loss and the decrease tensions in US-Soviet relations led the dream of Arab unity to rely on Arab governments to state. At the moment, it seems that the Arabs seem to have a consensus on the importance of relying on national interests rather than on the interests of the Arab unit, so we must say that the after-ISIS-Middle-East will witness the death of any dream of Arab-Arab unity at the state level.

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