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نقد نظریه جواز تقاص مالی بدون اذن حاکم؛ درنگی در قاعده حفظ نظام | ||
| پژوهشنامه حقوق اسلامی | ||
| مقالات آماده انتشار، پذیرفته شده، انتشار آنلاین از تاریخ 11 آذر 1403 اصل مقاله (681.91 K) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.30497/law.2024.247285.3652 | ||
| نویسنده | ||
| زینب سنچولی* | ||
| استادیار، گروه فقه و مبانی حقوق اسلامی، واحد زاهدان، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، زاهدان، ایران. | ||
| چکیده | ||
| در خصوص تقاص مالی بدون استیذان از حاکم، بین فقیهان اسلامی و حقوقدانان اتفاق‌نظر وجود ندارد؛ مشهور فقهاء معتقدند که مدّعی می‌تواند مستقلاً طلب خود را استیفا کند و مراجعه به حاکم لازم نیست؛ چه بیّنه‌ای محکمه‌پسند داشته باشد و چه نداشته باشد، و چه استیفای حق از طریق حاکم ممکن باشد و چه نباشد. در مقابل، گروهی دیگر از فقیهان قائل به عدم جواز تقاص مالی به‌صورت مستقل شده‌اند و معتقدند که داین نمی‌تواند مستقلاً استیفای حق کند؛ بلکه استیفای حق، تنها از طریق رجوع به حاکم جایز است؛ مگر در مواردی که ضرورت ایجاب کند، آن هم به‌شرطی که فتنه و فسادی به‌دنبال نداشته باشد. در پژوهش حاضر که به روش توصیفی تحلیلی صورت پذیرفته، این نتیجه حاصل شده است که قول مشهور فقهاء بر جواز تقاص مالی بدون استیذان از حاکم، در نظم حقوقی ایران قابل مناقشه است؛ چرا که با اصل یکصدوپنجاه‌ونهم قانون اساسی ناهماهنگ است، موجبات برهم‌خوردن نظم عمومی، اختلال در نظام، تضییق دایره قضاء و دادرسی در کشور و گسترش دادگستری خصوصی در جامعه را فراهم می‌آورد. وانگهی، امروزه امکان برخورداری از دادرسی عادلانه برای همگان فراهم است، لذا در این جستار قول دوم تقویت می‌گردد. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | ||
| تقاص؛ تقاص مالی؛ حاکم شرع؛ حفظ نظام؛ اختلال نظام؛ نظم عمومی | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Critique of the Theory of Permitting Financial Reprisal [Taqas] Without the Permission of the Islamic Ruler: A Reflection on the Rule of Maintaining the Islamic System | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Zeinab Sanchooli | ||
| Assistant Professor, Department of Jurisprudence and Fundamentals of Islamic Law, Zahedan Branch, Islamic Azad University, Zahedan, Iran. | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| ∴ Introduction ∴ The theory of permitting financial reprisal [Taqas] without the permission of the Islamic ruler has long been a contentious issue in Islamic jurisprudence. Rooted in the legal traditions of Islamic law, Taqas provides a mechanism for creditors to reclaim debts directly from a debtor's property in cases of denial or nonpayment. This concept raises critical questions about the balance between individual rights and state authority in the enforcement of justice. The discourse on Taqas has sparked considerable debate among jurists. While many Islamic scholars argue for its unrestricted applicability, others contend that it should be conditional upon judicial processes or explicit authorization from the Islamic ruler. This tension is particularly significant in the context of Article 159 of the Iranian Constitution, which centralizes judicial authority for addressing grievances. The practical implications of this theory extend beyond jurisprudential debates to the stability and functionality of modern Islamic states, as personal recourse to Taqas can lead to public disorder and undermine systemic order. This article critically examines whether financial reprisal, as a means of enforcing claims, should be permissible without the prior consent of the Islamic ruler. Drawing on Islamic jurisprudence, constitutional principles, and modern legal practices, it evaluates the legitimacy of Taqas in contemporary Iranian legal systems, particularly in light of the rule of necessity to preserve the Islamic system and maintain public order. ∴ Research Question ∴ The primary research question addressed in this study is: Is the exercise of financial reprisal [Taqas] permissible without the explicit permission of the Islamic ruler, particularly when the claimant possesses legal evidence [Bayyeneh] and has access to judicial processes? This inquiry seeks to clarify the legal and jurisprudential boundaries of Taqas and its compatibility with modern Islamic governance principles, focusing on the tension between traditional Islamic law and contemporary legal frameworks in Iran. ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ This research hypothesizes that financial reprisal [Taqas], while rooted in Islamic jurisprudence, is not a legally viable method of compensation in contemporary Iranian legal systems without the prior authorization of the Islamic ruler. The hypothesis is built on the following premises: Jurisprudential Framework: The Quranic and Hadith sources supporting Taqas emphasize justice but do not explicitly negate the need for regulatory oversight, particularly in a structured Islamic state. Constitutional Authority: Article 159 of the Iranian Constitution centralizes judicial authority, mandating that grievances and rights must be adjudicated through the judiciary, effectively nullifying the autonomous exercise of Taqas. Systemic Necessity: The "rule of necessity to preserve the Islamic system and prevent disorder" dictates that individual actions potentially causing disruption must be subordinated to judicial oversight to maintain societal stability. Contemporary Context: The implementation of Taqas in modern society, even when supported by Bayyeneh, could lead to public unrest, undermine judicial authority, and conflict with the principles of organized governance. ∴ Methodology & Framework, if Applicable ∴ This study adopts a doctrinal legal research methodology, focusing on analyzing primary sources of Islamic law, including the Quran, Hadith, and classical juristic opinions, as well as contemporary interpretations of these sources in Iranian legal practice. ∴ Results & Discussion ∴ The analysis reveals a significant divergence among Islamic jurists and legal scholars regarding the permissibility of personal financial reprisal [Taqas] without the authorization of the Islamic ruler. The majority stance permits independent Taqas, allowing creditors to reclaim their rights without seeking judicial approval or the ruler's permission. This position is underpinned by several key arguments: Unrestricted Scriptural Sources: Proponents cite Quranic verses and Hadiths that discuss Taqas in general terms, interpreting them as endorsements of an individual's right to self-redress without specifying the need for judicial oversight. Scholarly Consensus and Rational Proofs: Historical consensus among jurists and logical reasoning support the notion that denying a creditor the ability to reclaim their property directly could lead to injustice, especially in cases where the judicial system is inaccessible or ineffective. However, a contrasting viewpoint emphasizes the necessity of obtaining the Islamic ruler's authorization before exercising Taqas. This perspective is supported by the following considerations: Constitutional Mandates: Article 159 of the Iranian Constitution explicitly designates the judiciary as the sole authority for addressing grievances and adjudicating rights. Allowing personal Taqas undermines this constitutional provision by circumventing established legal processes. Preservation of Public Order: Independent acts of Taqas can lead to accusations of theft, property damage, and other criminal offenses. Such actions may escalate into personal disputes, resulting in broader societal discord and undermining the rule of law. Misuse of Rights and Overreach: Without judicial oversight, individuals might exploit Taqas to unjustly seize property, leading to potential abuses and violations of others' rights. Risk of Encouraging Private Justice: Permitting personal Taqas could set a precedent for individuals to take the law into their own hands, eroding trust in the judicial system and leading to chaos and corruption. Despite acknowledging the challenges within the judicial system—such as high litigation costs and procedural delays—the argument against independent Taqas emphasizes the greater societal harm that could result from bypassing judicial processes. The principle of preventing harm takes precedence over individual convenience, suggesting that enduring personal hardship is preferable to risking public disorder. The discussion also touches upon the "rule of necessity to preserve the Islamic system and prevent disorder." While Taqas is recognized as a legitimate measure within Islamic jurisprudence, its application must not conflict with the overarching need for societal stability and order. If personal Taqas leads to systemic disruption, it becomes imperative to prohibit it in favor of judicial resolution. Furthermore, the analysis highlights that financial Taqas should be limited to exceptional circumstances—specifically, when the claimant lacks legal evidence [Bayyeneh] or when judicial recourse is impractical or inaccessible. Even in such cases, the exercise of Taqas must be carefully regulated to prevent corruption and discord. The findings challenge the majority view of Shia jurists by arguing that independent Taqas should not be permitted when the creditor possesses Bayyeneh and has access to the judicial system. This stance reinforces the importance of upholding constitutional provisions and maintaining the integrity of the legal system. In synthesizing these perspectives, the study underscores the need for a holistic approach that balances individual rights with the collective well-being of society. The prevention of disorder and the preservation of public trust in legal institutions are paramount considerations that must guide the application of Taqas in contemporary contexts. ∴ Conclusion ∴ The discourse on the permissibility of financial reprisal [Taqas] without the Islamic ruler's authorization reveals deep-seated tensions between traditional jurisprudential interpretations and the demands of modern governance. While the majority of Islamic jurists historically permit independent Taqas, this study contends that such practices are incompatible with contemporary legal frameworks that prioritize systemic order and constitutional authority. The key conclusions drawn from the analysis are: Necessity of Judicial Oversight: Independent Taqas without the ruler's permission poses significant risks to public order and the integrity of the legal system. The judiciary serves as the appropriate channel for resolving disputes, ensuring that claims are validated through due process. Constitutional Alignment: Article 159 of the Iranian Constitution mandates that all grievances be addressed through the judiciary. Adhering to this provision is essential for upholding the rule of law and preventing the erosion of legal institutions. Preventing Societal Harm: Personal acts of Taqas can lead to criminal activities, such as theft or property damage, and may escalate into broader conflicts. The potential for misuse and abuse necessitates a cautious approach that prioritizes societal harmony over individual expedience. Limited Exceptions: While there may be exceptional cases where Taqas is permissible—such as when judicial avenues are inaccessible and the claimant lacks Bayyeneh—these instances should be carefully regulated to prevent corruption and disorder. Holistic Jurisprudential Perspective: Islamic law emphasizes justice, fairness, and the prevention of harm. Applying Taqas in a manner that aligns with these principles requires a balance between respecting traditional jurisprudence and adapting to contemporary societal needs. In conclusion, the study advocates for a reevaluation of the permissibility of financial Taqas without the Islamic ruler's authorization within modern legal systems. It emphasizes that, despite the historical acceptance of Taqas in Islamic jurisprudence, contemporary contexts demand adherence to constitutional mandates and judicial processes to maintain public order and trust in legal institutions. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها [English] | ||
| Taqas, Financial Reprisal, Islamic Ruler, System Preservation, System Disruption, Public Order | ||
| مراجع | ||
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